GASEOUS EMISSIONS

Gaseous emissions  

    Applicability 

The provisions of 2.3.2 shall apply to engines whose rated thrust is greater than 26.7 k.N and whose date of manufacture is on or after 1 January 1986 and as further specified for oxides of nitrogen.  

  

Regulatory levels 

Gaseous emission levels when measured and computed in accordance with the procedures of Appendix 3 and converted to characteristic levels by the procedures of Appendix 6, or equivalent procedures as agreed by the certificating authority, shall not exceed the regulatory levels determined from the following    a) For engines of a type or model for which the date of manufacture of the first individual production model was before 1 January 1996 and for which the date of manufacture of the individual engine was before 1 January 2000. b) For engines of a type or model for which the date of manufacture of the first individual production model was on or after 1 January 1996 or for which the date of manufacture of the individual engine was on or after 1 January 2000.   c) For engines of a type or model for which the date of manufacture of the first individual production model was on or after 1 January 2004 D) for engines of a type or model for which the date of manufacture of the first individual production model was on or after 1 January 2008 or for which the date of manufacture of the individual engine was on or after 1 January 2013 e) For engines of a type or model for which the date of manufacture of the first individual production model was on or after 1 January 2014.

 Note.― Guidance material on the definition and the use of equivalent procedures is provided in the Environmental Technical Manual (Doc 9501), Volume II — Procedures for the Emissions Certification of Aircraft Engines.

Information required 

 The information required is divided into three groups:  1) General information to identify the engine characteristics, the fuel used and the method of data analysis; 2) The data obtained from the engine test(s); and 3) The results derived from the test data.  

  General information 

The following information shall be provided for each engine type for which emissions certification is sought:  a) Engine identification;  b) Rated thrust (in kilo newton);  c) Reference pressure ratio;  d) Fuel specification reference;  e) Fuel hydrogen/carbon ratio;f) The methods of data acquisition;  g) The method of making corrections for ambient conditions; and  h) The method of data analysis.   

Test information 

The following information shall be provided for each engine tested for certification purposes at each of the thrust settings specified in 2.1.4.2. The information shall be provided after correction to the reference ambient conditions where applicable:  a) Fuel flow (kilograms/second);  b) Emission index (grams/kilogram) for each gaseous pollutant c) Measured Smoke Number.   

  Derived information

   The following derived information shall be provided for each engine tested for certification purposes:  a) Emission rate, i.e. emission index × fuel flow, (grams/second) for each gaseous pollutant b) Total gross emission of each gaseous pollutant measured over the LTO cycle (grams) c) Values of D.p /Foo for each gaseous pollutant (grams/kilo newton) d) Maximum Smoke Number The characteristic Smoke Number and gaseous pollutant emission levels shall be provided for each engine type for which emissions certification is sought.  

Offset Credits as an Option for Destination Green

Environment and climate change are serious global issues. Worldwide greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions will be necessary and unavoidable for sustainable industry and societal growth and international aviation is no exception to this. The following article looks at the progress that has been made to date in developing and implementing emissions trading systems. It also discusses the possibility of developing an ICAO carbon emissions trading scheme, and what the criteria and attributes of such a system would be. 

Flexibility Is Key

 Generally speaking, it is better to develop a wide variety of measures to achieve reduction targets effectively and efficiently. This is because there are many ever-changing variables in the mix, including the business environment, available technology, evolving technological innovations and changing investment strategies. Accordingly, the “flexibility of reduction measures” is crucial four primary options are considered for reducing emissions in the aviation sector: 1. Replacement of existing fleet with more efficient aircraft.2. Route optimization and improvement of ground services.3. Use of bio fuels as a zero emissions alternative energy source.
4. Offset credit mechanisms.Each of the above options has pros and cons. Design and commissioning of more efficient aircraft, as well as implementation of route optimization and ground system improvements are essential measures that are already ongoing, and reductions achieved through them will continue for many years.

International emission trading and possible offset credits for aviation

The carbon market is shifting from the two dominant market systems, Kyoto Credit and EU Allowance, to a fragmented markets regime. Following this structural change, various types of credits, both national and sub-national schemes, as well as project base emission reduction credits and allowances under ETS will soon be available for offsetting purposes.

Possible ICAO scheme

ICAO decide to develop its own aviation scheme, there are three important issues in particular that need to be considered: credit eligibility criteria, scheme governance and management, and how costs are transferred.Eligible Credits, Credit schemes, and measures need to be flexible in defining what types of credits could be accepted, in order to avoid uncertainty in the availability and cost of credits in the future market. Therefore, it is better to allow the use of several different types of credits and to construct offset credits which utilize undeveloped reduction space. Following are some guidelines that should be applied: •Emissions reductions should be confirmed objectively   and practically.• Heavy administration burden should  not impede reliable implementation. •Double counting should be avoided.• Credits should come from socially acceptable   projects.

Eligibility criteria

1/ Reduction should be confirmed objectively and practically. 2/ heavy administration burden should not impede reliable implementation.3/ "double counting" should be avoided. 4/ Credits should come from socially accepted projects 

Governance

 Governance of the offset credit mechanism is also crucial. Conflicts among members based on differing points of view may arise during the design and implementation of the mechanism. Experience and know-how are necessary to construct and implement an effective mechanism. A practical solution would be to set up a committee of experts. When doing so, neutrality and expertise will be essential criteria for participation. This Experts Committee should be independent of ICAO and its members should be specialists in their fields, including: carbon markets, finance and investment, technology, and energy and legal issues. They should not represent any interested parties and need to participate only in their personal and professional capacities as experts in their field.

Achieving Carbon Neutral growth from 2020

How big is the gap?

Any estimate of the emissions gap first requires a projection of international aviation emissions absent an MBM. This in turn depends on many factors including: growth in demand for international air travel, the number and type of planes used to meet this demand, technical improvements in aircraft efficiency, fleet replacement phasing, improvements to air traffic management systems, and fuel mix, including biofuels.

Uncertainties in these factors generate a wide range of projections for the cumulative emissions gap. The latest estimate for the “central” scenario from ICAO’s Committee on Aviation and Environmental Protection (CAEP) shows a gap ranging between 14 and 21bn t (billion tonne) over the 30 years from 2020 to 2050. Assuming a conservative potential contribution from alternative fuels the range would be 13bnt to 20bnt3.

Sources of carbon units to offset the gap

From a macro perspective, the global aviation sector currently accounts for about 2% of world CO2 emissions. Growth in air travel is expected to double by around 2040. International aviation comprises about two thirds of the total. Offsetting this growth is not expected to pose a problem for the industry.
In theory, to offset international aviation’s emissions growth, emissions could be reduced anywhere else. Units from any of the world’s existing emissions cap and trade programmes, or those under development, could be used. In addition, the UN and other bodies recognize over a hundred categories of carbon credits-producing projects in sectors where there is no cap on emissions.

Potential supply

Four main sources of supply could provide emissions units to meet the aviation industry’s goals: 1. Emissions allowances from national or regional cap and trade programmes.2. Emissions allowances created under the Kyoto Protocol.3. Credits from UN registered emission reduction projects.4. Credits from voluntary offset projects.

“Supply”

 Summary BNEF estimates that if environmental integrity concerns can be addressed, the above units present a maximum available supply of up to 4.4bnt by the year 2020. This 
supply  is only what is likely to be left unused, based on historic and expected credit generation activities in existing programmes and voluntary markets. It does not include the potentially substantial new supply that could be brought to market to meet additional demand.

Costs

 Taking   ICAO’s  CAEP 2013 figures, along with an assumption for alternative fuel reductions, the international aviation sector could face a shortfall of between 13bnt and 20bnt of CO2 offsets  over the 30 years from 2020 to 2050. On the basis of a central estimate of around 16.5bnt, the currently identifiable surpluses of 4.4bnt could meet around a quarter of this demand. Beyond this, additional investment would be needed to reduce emissions from sources outside the international aviation sector.Two scenarios are created on the emissions reduction requirements for existing and newly formed cap and trade schemes outside the aviation sector:   

Scenario 1   assumes these schemes require a 50% cut in emissions by 2050 and    Scenario 2  a 25%    cut. It is also assumed that these schemes will limit the use of offsets to some extent and that offsets used in the aviation sector must meet strict environmental integrity criteria.

The analysis shows the unit cost of offsets increasing from about $6-7/t in 2015 to around $29-39/t by 2050. These prices  imply   annualized estimated   costs through 2050     of $4.3-$7.8 billion per year under Scenario 1, and $3.3-$6.1billion per year under Scenario 2.     

   

Cost transfer

The cost of offset credits is also a crucial issue. Carbon costs are caused by the creation of external carbon emissions when fuel is burned, and are therefore theoretically part of the fuel cost. Accordingly, these additional costs should be passed on to passengers. Using ICAO’s carbon calculator, per passenger emissions from a return flight from Tokyo to New York (business and first class) is 3.1 tonnes, which is US$ 0.8 per pax, when half of the emissions are offset by using the current CER. The economic burden is actually not that large, but awareness of carbon costs is important. One of the practical options for collecting carbon costs is by way of a “carbon surcharge”. It shows the carbon cost explicitly and is therefore transparent. 

Market-based Measure’s and the United Nations

Background and origins

 Convention the overarching international agreement on climate change, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. Its ultimate objective is the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous human-induced interference with the climate  system.  

 The Convention has been ratified by almost  all countries (195 Parties at the time of writing), which meet annually to review the implementation of the Convention.At their first meeting (COP1, 1995), Parties agreed that the commitments under the Convention were inadequate for addressing climate change, and they launched a process to strengthen them. To guide this process, they agreed that developed countries should take the lead in reducing emissions, calling upon them to accept quantified targets for their domestic emissions and to elaborate policies and measures to meet those targets.

Kyoto Protocol

   Kyotoprotocol                                                                            

 The outcome of the above process was the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted at the third meeting of the Parties to the   Convention (COP3, 1997) and   entered into force in 2005 The  Kyoto Protocol establishes a legal framework by which developed countries accept emission targets for their domestic emissions for periods of time, known as commitment periods. The Kyoto Protocol does not prescribe emission targets for developing countries. Two commitment periods have been agreed to date: a first commitment period from 2008 to 2012, and a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020.

Market-based

Measures Three market-based measures were established under the Kyoto Protocol.The largest and best known of these measures is the clean development mechanism (CDM), which provides for, first, the registration of projects that reduce emissions in a developing country and, second, the issuance of units equivalent to the emission reductions achieved by these projects.These reductions are measured as the difference between:

(i)      baseline emissions (i.e. what emissions would have been in the absence of the project), and

(ii)     Actual emissions (i.e. what emissions actually were). 

These units may then be transferred to other entities, most commonly to counterbalance, or offset, their emissions. Units may be issued for a crediting period of ten years, or for seven years that may be renewed twice.

  The second market-based measure established under the Kyoto Protocol is joint implementation (JI), which operates similarly to the CDM but with two notable differences. First, JI focuses on projects in developed countries, rather than developing countries.  Second, JI has two tracks; its first track allows an individual developed country to set its own standards for measuring emission reductions and issuing units, while its second track operates much like the CDM in being governed by an international regulatory body. The first track is by far the larger of the two, with approximately 98% of units under JI being issued under this track.The third market-based measure is international emissions trading (IET), which involves the transfer of emissions units between developed countries, usually between governments. 

 Environmental integrity: As units correspond to the difference between baseline emissions (which are, by definition, hypothetical) and actual emissions, baselines must be properly set to prevent the issuance of non-additional units.

Sustainable development: As explained above, a condition of registration is that a host country provides a letter confirming that the CDM project helps it achieve sustainable development.

Regional distribution: The geographic imbalance of the CDM is a frequent source of concern, with over two thirds of registered projects (and over three-quarters of all issued CERs) originating from China and India. That said, current trends suggest a growing number of projects in other countries, most notably in Africa.

 Operational efficiency: In its initial years, the timelines for registering projects and issuing CERs were protracted, taking several months and at times up to and exceeding one year. Allegations of complex, non-user-friendly guidance were also made.

Level of aggregation: The CDM traditionally assessed emission reductions on a facility-by-facility basis. This has prompted claims that much broader coverage is needed, whereby emissions are measured and then reduced at broader levels of aggregation (e.g. an entire industrial sector).

Net decrease in emissions: A commonly voiced concern about the CDM is that it is generally used as an offsetting mechanism, whereby emissions reduced in one location simply entitle emissions to be increased elsewhere

Governance: The CDM is governed by a ten-person executive body. Various reforms have been undertaken to make its operations more transparent, although further initiatives are under consideration (e.g. clear criteria for appointment, objective code of conduct).

These reforms are being considered as part of the review of the CDM rules, which the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol are expected to resolve at their year-end meeting in Warsaw. These reforms have also been informed by the findings of the High-level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, a blue-ribbon group which released a comprehensive report in 2012   on means to reform the CDM.Negotiations under the Convention In parallel with the negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol on existing market-based measures, the Parties to the Convention are engaged in negotiations under the Convention on new measures.At their meeting in Bali  (COP13, 2007),  Parties  agreed to consider “various approaches, including opportunities for using markets” as tools to enhance emission reductions.